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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. BRIEF NATURE OF THE CASE 
he- -Plaintiff -Appell;ant; hereinafter---COWARD, --f iled---a- 
I Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement over property of 
the Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter HADLEY. Two (2) days 
before the trial, COWARD moved to amend to add theories of 
implied easement and of express easement. 
11. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL 
COWARD'S proceeding at trial was largely their facts on 
the claim of prescriptive easement, which was dismissed by 
I 
the Court setting forth findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and an Order in open Court and on the record. An Order 
of Dismissal was entered (R. p. 59), and the issues of 
I 
I - _ _easement by implication and express easement were retained 
I 
for further determination. 
I 
There was no more of the trial, as the remaining issues 
were submitted on briefing from the parties. The Court 
issued a Memorandum Opinion (R. p. 79) that COWARD failed to 
prove entitlement upon the theories of prescriptive 
easement, implied easement, or express easement. Motions to 
reconsider were submitted and the Court issued an Amended 
Memorandum Decision and Orders on Post Trial Motions (R. p. 
99) which again denied any relief to COWARD with additional 
findings and conclusions by the Court. Judgment in Favor of 
the Defendant and Against the Plaintiff was entered August 
4, 2009. (R. p. 118) 
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HADLEY sought an award of attorney fees (R. p. 121), 
which was resisted by COWARD. (R. p. 132). The Court denied 
an award of attorney fees to HADLEY (R. p. 144). COWARD 
filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 137) HADLEY filed a Notice 
of Cross-Appeal. (R. p. 140). 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
COWARD'S paragraph C. Statement of Facts is short and 
concise; however, the Court's Amended Memorandum (R. p. 99) 
sets forth more accurate findings of fact, as paragraph A. 1 
through 14, which is relied upon by HADLEY. 
A map of the area in issue is Plaintiff's Exhibit 42, a 
copy of which is HADLEY'S Attachment A to this brief for 
reference. HADLEY'S Lot 1 is depicted as is COWARD'S Lot 2, 
which has markings showing the claimed easement as the strip 
in question. 
The legal and factual issues start with the Court's 
findings of fact 1 and 2. (R. p. 99-100) that state, 
1. Plaintiffs (Cowards) are the owners of Lot 2, 
Block JJ of the Laws addition to the City of 
Sandpoint. Defendant (Crystal HADLEY) is the 
owher of Lot 1, Block JJ of the Laws addition to 
the City of Sandpoint. The Coward's lot, the 
HADLEY'S lot, and the adjoining Lot 11, lying 
directly to the south of the Coward's, were owned 
by Freeman Daughters in 1922. 
2. In 1922, by Instrument No. 53126, Daughters 
transferred Lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sletager with the 
following in the legal description: 
Lots One (1) and two (2) in Block "JJ" 
of Law's second Addition to Sandpoint, 
Idaho; provided, however, the party of 
the first part herein [Daughters] his 
heirs and assigns shall have a permanent 
right of way over and across twelve feet 
on the east side or end of each of said 
lots for the purpose of an alley. 
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In other words, in 1922 Freeman Daughters owned Lots 1, 
I 
I 2 and 11, all adjacent lots, in the City of Sandpoint, 
ounty, Idaho, and he kept Lot 11 and by Warran 
Deed conveyed Lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sletager reserving a 12 
foot wide easement on the east side. 
I In easement language, Lots 1 and 2 were the servient 
real estate and Lot 11 retained by Daughters was the 
dominant real estate. Daughters, 3 years later, conveyed 
the dominant estate, Lot 11, to Jack Blake, and the deed 
contained language also conveying the easement that 
Daughters had reserved over the 12 feet on the east end of 
I Lots 1 and 2. 
Sletager had acquired Lots 1 and 2 from Daughters, and 
I as to Lot 1 and 2, neither Lot would have an easement over 
the other Lot because Sletager owned both Lots. An easement 
is the right to use the land of another. Ownership of Lot 1 
and 2 was ultimately divided, as stated by the Court in its 
Findings of Fact, A. 5 (R. p. LOO), that 
"Lot 2 was ultimately deeded to George 
and Alice Donahue, the Cowardsr 
predecessors in interest, who were not 
conveyed any easement over Lot 1. Lot 2 
in the chain of title has never had an 
appurtenant easement over Lot 1. Lot 2 
was the Servient estate to an easement 
in favor of 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In addition to the Issues presented on Appeal by 
COWARD, as issues 1, 2 and 3, HADLEY presents the following 
additional issues : 
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4. LOT 11 IS THE DOMINANT ESTATE AND LOTS 1 AND 
2 ARE THE SERVIENT ESTATE, LOTS 1 AND 2 BEING 
CONVEYED TO SLETAGER, SLETAGER OWNED BOTH 
LOTS AND AS A MATTER OF LAW COULD NOT HAVE AN 
EASEMENT OVER HIS OWN LOT 1 IN FAVOR OF HIS 
LOT 2. 
5. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING 
ATTORNEY FEES TO HADLEY? THIS IS HADLEY'S 
ISSUE ON HER CROSS-APPEAL. 
6. IS HADLEY ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL - CLAIMED 
HADLEY claims attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
41, the basis of which is that COWARD brought and pursued and 
this Appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and 
from the facts presented is frivolous, unreasonable, and 
without merit. The basis of HADLEYrS claim for attorney fees 
is I.R.C.P. 54(e) (l), Idaho Code 512-121, and -- Idaho Code 512- 
123(a)(b-ii). COWARD'S conduct upon this appeal is frivolous 
in that it is not supported in fact or warranted under 
existing law, and can not be supported by a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
COWARD assigns three (3) issues presented on appeal. 
HADLEY responds to each, as follows: 
ISSUE 1. Whether the Trial Court committed error when 
it determined that the fence line agreement extinguished any 
easement rights that COWARD may have had over HADLEY'S 
property? 
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 1: 
a) The Trial Court did not err in determining that 
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the Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit D, 
extinguished (released) any easement rights of COWARD over 
HADLEY'S property. 
... tfiis dG~ceermiiiation was in .error, ..it is 
irrelevant because COWARD had no easement over HADLEY'S 
property, either express or implied. 
The Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit 
D, was signed, acknowledged, and recorded the last week of 
February, 2007, just nine (9) months before COWARD filed 
this action on November 29, 2007. COWARD'S Argument, 
Appellant's Brief, top of page 7, is that the Agreement does 
not extinguish or release COWARD'S claimed easement, because 
an easement is the right to use the land of another for a 
specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general 
use of the property by the owner. (citation given for 
Backman v .  Laurence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 765, 80). 
HADLEY agrees with the foregoing as an accurate statement of 
law; however, COWARD does not define or set forth Idaho law 
that an easement is an interest in land of another. 
Schultz v .  Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 554 P.2d 948 (1996) at 
page 773 states, 
"The term "easement" has been variously 
defined and a detailed definition of the 
term is not necessary for the purposes 
of this opinion. However, an essential 
element of an easement is that it is "an 
interest in land in the possession of 
another". Restatement of Property S450 
(1944). 
[3,4J Creation of an easement by express 
agreement requires that the agreement be 
in writing as an easement is an interest 
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in real property. I.C. §9-503 McReynolds 
v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 
(1914) ***". 
Clearly, an easement is an interest in real property of 




The District Court held that the Agreement As To 
Boundary Line was a release by agreement between the owner 
of the easement (COWARD) and the owner (HADLEY) of the 
i servient tenement. 
I 
COWARD tries to narrow the full provisions of the 
I 
Boundary Line Agreement, by referring to it as "the fence 
I line agreementr1. COWARD states that the agreement pertains 
I 
only to ownership of the parties' respective properties and 
does not pertain to easements. (Appellant's Brief, pg 7, 
last paragraph) HADLEY submits that COWARD is in error 
because an "easement" is an ownership interest in real 
property of another. COWARD claims an easement in the real 
property of HADLEY. COWARD'S Appellant's Brief pages 5-6 
included language of the Agreement. The last provision of 
the Agreement that is a release of COWARD'S claimed easement 
to HADLEY'S Lot 1 is the provision that says, 
"***/  and another other legal, equitable, or 
statutory doctrine does not apply to alter 
the legal descriptions, ownership, boundary, 
or title to the real estate of either party." 
Applying this above quoted provision is that if COWARD 
I 
I had a claimed easement to HADLEY'S Lot 1 it would alter 
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HADLEY'S ownership and title because the claimed easement as 
an interest in HADLEY'S real estate would diminish her title 
and her ownership as it would create a servitude against 
COWARD'S Lot 2 as the dominant 
estate. An easement would be an encumbrance against 
HADLEY'S real estate as the Servient real estate in favor of 
COWARD'S real estate at the dominant real estate. 
In this action COWARD specifically claimed the easement 
they sought was an encumbrance on HADLEY'S Lot 1. The 
District Court, Findings of Fact 14 states, 
"Anne Coward subsequently recorded a Lis 
Pendens (Instrument No. 744377) as part 
of this action, in which she claimed an 
"encumbrance" on Crystal Hadley's Lot 
1." 
An easement for COWARD would create a "servitude" on 
HADLEY'S real estate. The case of Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 
Idaho 433, 467 P.2d 276 (1989) further explains that, 
"An easement may be created by way of 
exception or by reservation. Technically, an 
exception is the withholding of title to a 
portion of the property conveyed by the 
grantor; a reservation creates some new right 
in favor of the grantor in the conveyed 
property, conceptually thought of as an 
express grant of the easement by the grantee. 
See, 2 0. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY $23332, 334 ( j . 
Grimes 1980 replacement). No particular 
forms or words of art are necessary; it is 
necessary only that the parties make clear 
their intention to establish a servitude. 
Regardless of the terms used, courts 
generally will attempt to ascertain the 
intention of the parties by referring not 
only to the language of the deed, but also to 
the circumstances attending the transaction 
and the condition of the property. Id. 
Seccombe v. Weeks, 
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115 Idaho 433, 467 P.2d 276 (1989) 
An easement is also a conveyance which affects title to 
j real property. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 
''[13] Idaho Code $56-101 is addressed to 
"conveyances" and "liens" which have not been 
recorded at the time a foreclosure action 
commences. The statute mandates that a 
foreclosure judgment is conclusive against 
the parties holding unrecorded conveyances or 
liens. Although not made applicable to I.C. 
6 - 1 0  a "conveyance" is defined in Idaho 
Code Title 55, Chapter 8 as "[embracing] 
every instrument in writing by which any 
estate or interest in real property is 
created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, 
or by which the title to any real property 
may be affected, except wills." 
West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 
141 Idaho 75 at p. 83 (2004), 467 P.2d 276 (1989) 
ISSUE 2. Whether the language in the 1922 deed from 
Freeman Daughters to O.E. Sletager created an express 
easement appurtenant to COWARD'S lot which would allow 
COWARD access to the lot across the back of HADLEY'S lot? 
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 2: The answer to the issue 
phrased by COWARD is that the language in the 1922 deed from 
Daughters to Sletager could - not as a matter of law create an 
express easement appurtenant to COWARD'S Lot 2 allowing 
COWARD access to the lot (lot 2) across the back of HADLEY'S 
lot (lot 1). This is based on a straight forward definition 
of an easement. When Daughters deeded Lots 1 and 2 to 
Sletager, Sletager then owned Lots 1 and 2 and Daughters 
retained and owned Lot 11. The express easement language 
was for a reserved easement over Lots 1 and 2 in favor of, 
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or appurtenant, to Daughters' Lot 11. 
What easement would be created as between Lots 1 and 2? 
The answer is none because Sletager then owned Lots 1 and 2 
ed 
over these lots because both lots were owned by Sletager. 
It is by definition that an easement is an interest in land 
in the possession of another. (Schultz v .  Atkins, 97 Idaho 
770, 773, 554 P.2d 948 (1976) . 
One can not have an easement in his own land. In other 
words, Sletager could not have an easement in favor of his 
Lot 2 over his own Lot 2. 
It is simply not possible for a person to own both an 
easement and the property to which that easement attaches. 
In Gardner v .  Fliegel, 92 Idaho 676, 771, 450 P.2d 990 
(1969), Fliegel had been conveyed property by two separate 
warranty deeds. The deed covering the easterly portion of 
the property included the phrase "less a strip 30 feet wide 
of the east side for a roadway and all ditch rights of way. 
The ultimate issue presented at trial was to determine what 
the parties intended by the term "less a strip of land 30 
feet wide off the East side for roadwayrf. (Gardner v.  
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 769. Gardner asserted that the 30 
foot strip was excepted completely from the conveyances to 
Fliegel. Fliegel contended that they had been granted title 
to the thirty (30) foot strip, subject to an easement for a 
roadway. The Supreme Court ruled the language used was 
ambiguous, as on the one hand it expresses intent to retain 
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the fee to the strip in the grantor. On the other it 
expresses the intent to create an easement for roadway over 
e strip in favor of the grantor. The second expression of 
"***for the reason that "an easement is 
defined as a right in the lands of 
another, and therefore one cannot have 
an easement in his own lands, ***Johnson 
v. Gustafson, 49 Idaho 376, 381, 288 P. 
427, 429 (1930) ". 
Gardner v.  Fliegel 
92 Idaho 767 at 771, 450 P.2d 990 (1969) 
I The District Judge's findings of fact, paragraph A., 3 
through 14, (Amended Memorandum Decision, R. pg 100-102) is 
l 
a complete chronological recital of the subsequent 
I conveyances of Lots 1 and 2 (Servient easement) and Lot 11 
(dominant estate - to which the Daughters' reservation of 
easement was appurtenant). 
"Findings of Fact 4. First, three (3) years 
after 1922, Daughters transferred Lot 11 to 
Blake, the deed contained the following 
language : 
Also, a permanent right of way over and 
across twelve feet on the east side or 
end of Lots one (1) and two (2), Block 
\'JJr' Laws Second Addition to Sandpoint, 
Idaho, for the purposes of an alley. 
In other words, Lot 11 was conveyed by Daughters 
together with an easement that he has reserved over Lots 1 
and 2 when he conveyed them to Sletager. 
Subsequently Lots 1 and 2 were conveyed separately to 
new owners. Finding of Fact 5. (R. p. 100) states: 
"Lot 2 was ultimately deeded to George 
and Alice Donahue, the Cowards' 
predecessors in interest, who were not 
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conveyed any easement over Lot 1. Lot 2 
in the chain of title has never had an 
appurtenant easement over Lot 1. Lot 2 
was the servient estate to an easement 
in favor of Lot 11. '' 
t conveye 
-
easement when Lot 2 was separated from Lot 1. Donahue is a 
predecessor of COWARD in the chain of title to Lot 2. The 
District Court's Finding of Fact 5 is dispositive and is 
fatal to COWARD'S appeal issue 2, and the District Court 
expanded on the Lot 2 chain of title saying, 
Finding of Fact 9. (R.  p. 101) 
"Alice Donahue, as a widow, deeded Lot 2 
to Chapman (Instrument No. 117518), in 
1968 without any conveyance of an 
easement in favor of Lot 2. Chapman 
deeded Lot 2 (Instrument No. 172403) in 
1976 to Montgomery without any 
conveyance of an easement in favor of 
 LO^ 2Trr 
For this appeal, COWARD, has not claimed the District 
Court made any errors in the Findings of Fact, at all. 
COWARD has accepted the findings of fact 1 through 14, which 
clearly demonstrate that Lot 2 never acquired any express 
easement at any time; more specifically Lot 1 and 2 were 
conveyed by Daughters in common ownership to Sletager, so as 
a matter of law Lot 2 could not have an appurtenant easement 
in its favor to go across Lot 1. When Lot 2 was separated 
from Lot 1, there could be "nov automatic appurtenant 
easement. Further no easement was ever conveyed or reserved 
in favor of Lot 2; as the District Court found (Finding of 
Fact, 5, second sentence, R. p. 101), 
"Lot 2 in the chain of title has never 
had an appurtenant easement over Lot 1." 
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ISSUE 3. Whether the language in the 1922 deed from 
Freeman Daughters to O.E. Sletager created an implied 
1 asement app 
I COWARD access to their lot across the back of HADLEY'S lot? 
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 3: The Idaho law of implied 
easements is such that the 1922 deed from Daughters to 
Sletager could not create an implied easement over Lot 1 for 
use by Lot 2. First, the elementary law of easements, 
previously set forth in this brief is that an easement is 
the right to use the land of another. In 1922 when Sletager 
acquired Lots 1 and 2, he owned both lots and could use his 
lots for access, or otherwise, in any location he desired. 
He could not, as a matter of law, have an easement, express, 
implied, or prescriptive over his own Lot 2 in favor of his 
own Lot 1. 
Second, COWARD has not stated or set forth the Idaho 
law of implied easements. Rather, COWARD'S argument on 
implied easement seems to be set forth in paragraph B. 
starting on page 13 to the end of Appellant's Brief. 
COWARD'S case law and argument is set forth under a new and 
different theory of law, never raised or briefed as part of 
the District Court action. 
COWARD'S Argument and law on the theory of an implied 
easement commences at paragraph B on page 13, and continues 
to the end of Appellant's Brief. COWARD makes no citation 
of Idaho law on implied easements. Rather, COWARD cites to 
Idaho law on dedication of a public way. This is Smylie v.  
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Pea r sa l l ,  93 Idaho 188, 191, 475 P.2d 427, 430 (1969) which 
holds t h a t  f i l i n g  a p l a t  showing streets and a l l e y s  on t he  
p l a t  and s a l e s  are made with reference the re to ,  cons t i tu tes  
LEY does no t  
d ispute  t h i s  case l a w ,  bu t  her  response i s  t h a t  such a 
theory and case law w a s  not  advanced a t  t r ial  l e v e l ,  bu t  
r a the r  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  on appeal.  Further ,  COWARD s t a t e s  
t h a t  "it followsfr t h a t  when a g r an t  i s  bounded by an a l l e y  
an implied r i g h t  t o  use t h a t  a l l e y  i n  a l l  those who abut i t  
a r i s e s .  COWARD f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t ,  "This i s  not  a novel 
theory, j u s t  one no t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  adopted i n  Idaho." I n  
o ther  words, t h i s  i s  not  Idaho law! 
The problem with COWARD'S statement t h a t  "it follows" 
t h a t  where a g ran t  i s  bounded by an a l l e y  is not  within the 
f a c t s  of t h e  i n s t a n t  ac t ion .  Lots 1 and 2 a r e  not  bounded 
by an a l l e y  on t h e  P l a t .  ( P l a i n t i f f s '  Exhibi t  42 and 
Defendant's Exhibi t s  C and Q) . 
COWARD'S only Idaho c i t a t i o n  i s  t o  t h e  Smylie v. 
Pea r sa l l  case, supra,  on t he  e f f e c t  of a dedicat ion on a 
p l a t .  COWARD presen t s  no case l a w  on "implied easements". 
COWARD'S remaining argument on page 1 4  i s  of a general  
s t r i n g  of c i t a t i o n s  from other  j u r i sd i c t i ons ,  with no 
ana lys i s  of how they apply. Idaho has d e f i n i t e  and spec i f i c  
l a w  on implied easements, which i s  a s  fol lows:  
An implied easement can a r i s e  from p r i o r  use o r  
necess i ty .  Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 
(1999) a t  642 s t a t e s  t h a t  from p r i o r  cases it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
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there are two kinds of implied easements: (1) by way of 
necessity; and (2) implied from prior use. In 1922 Sletager 
was conveyed Lots 1 and 2, with the grantor (Daughters) 
reserving an easement over 
Daughters' remaining property Lot 11. Lot 11 is the 
dominant estate to which the reserved easement is 
appurtenant. The easement status at that time in 1922 as 
between Lots 1 and 2, is nothing. First, Sletager then owns 
Lots 1 and 2 and can "access" anywhere on either lot to and 
from the other lot. He as owner has no easement to use land 
of another. Neither necessity nor prior use existed. 
Further, the Idaho law of implied easement is: 
A) The law on implied easement as a way of necessity 
is defined in Burley Brick and Sand, 102 Idaho 333, 629 P.2d 
1116 (1981) is: 
'A way of necessity arises where there 
is a conveyance of a part of a tract of 
land of such nature and extent that 
either the part conveyed or the part 
retained is entirely surrounded by the 
land from which it is severed or by this 
land and the land of strangers. It is a 
universally established principal that 
where a tract of land is conveyed which 
is separated from the highway by other 
lands of the grantor or surrounded by 
his lands or by his and those of third 
persons, there arises, by implication, 
in favor of the grantee, a way of 
necessity across the premises of the 
grantor to the highway." 
The Lots 1, 2 and 11 are all in the Amended Plat of 
Law's Second Addition (1904), a depiction of which is the 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 42. As is apparent, Lots 1, 2, and 11 
are all contiguous to a Sandpoint, Idaho, City Street, Boyer 
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Avenue on their west side. This is shown from trial 
exhibits that are the Plat (Defendant's Exhibit Q )  , the 
Record of Survey, recorded May 20, 2000 as Instrument No., 
564398 (Defendant's laintiff' s 
Exhibit 42). Since all of Lots 1, 2, and 11 are adjoining 
Boyer Avenue, a public street, i.e. a highway, none of the 
lots have any necessity to have an implied easement. 
B) The law on implied easement by way of implication 
is D a v i s  v .  Peacock, supra, 133 Idaho 637 at 642, 
". . . (1) unity of title or ownership and 
subsequent separation by grant of the 
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous 
use long enough before separation of the 
dominant estate to show that the use was 
intended to be permanent; and (3) the 
easement must be reasonably necessary to 
the proper enjoyment of the dominant 
estate . . . "  
D a v i s  v .  Peacock 
133 Idaho 637 at 642 (1999) 
COWARD presented no testimony or evidence of elements 
(2) and (3). There is nothing in the record as to (2) 
apparent continuous use before the 1922 separation of Lots 1 
and 2 from Lot 11. Also, there is nothing in the record as 
to an implied easement because of necessity to the use of 
dominant estate. The opposite is true, Lots 1, 2 and 11 all 
adjoin Boyer Avenue, a public street, so there is no 
necessity, at all. 
COWARD'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF HAS NO "CONCLUSION" 
I.A.R. 35(a) requires the Appellant's Brief to have 
divisions under appropriate headings. I.A.R. 35 (a)(7) 
requires a heading of: Conclusion. A short conclusion 
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stating the precise relief sought. COWARD'S Appellant's 
Brief has no such heading and it has no statement, precise 
I or otherwise of the relief sought. 
n 
1 result in the Supreme Court refusing to address the non- 
complied with I.A.R. In Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 
497, 927 P.2d 887 (1996) the cross-appellants listed in 
their initial brief on appeal as an additional issue on 
I 
appeal an award of all costs incurred after their offer of 
I judgment. Also, the appellant in its statement of issues in 
its initial brief on appeal requested an award of attorney 
i fees. The Supreme Court did not address either of these 
because the briefs did comply with I .A.R. (a) ( 6 )  
! In the instant action, COWARD has not complied with 
I I .A.R. 35 (a) (7) . The case of SE/Z Construction v. Idaho 
State University, 140 Idaho 8, 89 P.3d 848 (2004) at page 14 
specifically states that I.A.R. 35(a)(7) requires that an 
Appellant's Brief contain a short statement stating the 
precise relief sought. The respondent asserted that the 
appellant's brief failed to state what relief appellant 
seeks. The Supreme Court stated, 
"*** In its conclusion, the appellants' 
brief states: "the Court's original 
opinion should be withdrawn, and the 
State and ISU should be required to 
follow their own clear and unambiguous 
bid documents. The matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for 
determination of an appropriate remedy 
to which SE/Z is entitled under the 
circumstances." In the context of this 
appeal, this is a sufficient statement 
of the relief appellant seeks for 
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purposes of I.A.R. 35(a) (7) ." 
Unlike SE/Z Construction v .  Idaho State University, 
supra, COWARD'S initial brief, its Appellant's Brief, has no 
t, at all, 
relief is sought on appeal. The Supreme Court should not 
have the duty to search and review the record for errors or 
to give relief to COWARD on appeal. HADLEY requests that no 
relief be granted to COWARD on appeal because of the failure 
to comply with I.A.R. 35 (a) (7) . 
HADLEY'S CROSS-APPEAL ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL 
The District Court found HADLEY to be the prevailing 
party below, but declined to award attorney fees to HADLEY. 
HADLEY filed Defendant's Motion To Alter, Amend, Reconsider, 
And To Make Additional Findings And Conclusions Awarding 
Attorney Fees To The Defendant and Notice of Hearing and 
Oral Argument, which is in the record at R. p. 121-131. 
This Motion included a request to award attorney fees, with 
the supporting citations of law and an analysis of the facts 
presented and the results obtained. The basis of the 
request for attorney fees was Rule 54(a)(l) and Idaho Code 
912-121. At the hearing on HADLEY'S Motion, the District 
Judge orally denied attorney fees on a conclusion basis, set 
forth at R. p. 136, and entered an Order Denying Defendant 
Hadleyrs Motion To Alter, Amend, Reconsider, And To Make 
Additional Findings And Conclusions Awarding Attorney Fees 
To The Defendant (R. p. 144-145). Neither the oral ruling 
nor the written Order of the District Court had any findings 
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setting forth the basis and reasons for denial of attorney 
fees to HADLEY, except address the result in the negative, 
1 i.e. the Court does not find that COWARD brought, pursued, 
foundation. (R. p. 145) . Why not? 
HADLEY had submitted a total analysis showing how 
COWARD pursued the action and failed totally. HADLEY'S 
analysis is further presented herein. 
The Complaint pled only one theory, which was an 
easement by prescription. 
The Answer and Counterclaim alleged that COWARD had no 
express easement, easement by necessity, easement by 
implication, easement by prescription, or any other easement 
to use KADLEY'S real estate; further, that the Complaint and 
action was frivolous, unreasonable, and without merit and 
that HADLEY was entitled to recover her attorney fees from 
the COWARD. The Counterclaim, paragraph 11, alleged that by 
an Agreement as to Boundary Line, recorded February 26, 
2007, Instrument No. 723577, COWARD had extinguished any 
interest for access or other legal or equitable doctrine and 
sought quiet title as to HADLEY'S real estate against 
COWARD, and it sought attorney fees. 
The Trial was held September 29, 2008. For the trial, 
HADLEY filed Hadley's Trial Memorandum and Proposed Finding 
and Conclusions, filed September 16, 2008, which pointed out 
the elements and the inability of COWARD to prove a 
prescriptive easement. Further, the Agreement as to 
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Boundary Line provided that the possession, occupancy, or 
use of the real estate was by consent and no doctrine would 
I apply to alter ownership or title to the real property. 
ts or law 
relative to the issue of a prescriptive easement; however, 
COWARD went to trial and proceeded on their prescriptive 
easement action. At the end of the trial on the 
prescriptive easement claim HADLEY moved for "non-suit" 
against COWARD, which was then taken under advisement by the 
Court. At the end of HADLEY'S defense to the prescriptive 
easement action the Court granted a Rule 41(b) involuntary 
dismissal; and alternatively entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in open Court, upon the record that 
HADLEY prevailed on the trial of the merits and the 
Complaint for prescriptive easement was dismissed. (See, 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Dismissing 
Plaintiffs' Cause Of Action For Prescriptive Easement)(R. p. 
59). COWARD'S prescriptive easement claim was not supported 
by facts in their case to avoid a Rule 41 dismissal. In 
other words, from the "facts presented" by COWARD, their 
case was entirely devoid of any merit, i.e. frivolous, 
unreasonable, and without foundation. 
COWARD'S Amended Complaint set forth claims of Express 
Easement and Easement by Implication, but COWARD'S Trial 
Brief, page 4, first sentence, admits: 
"There is no Idaho case on this type of implied 
easement. " 
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COWARD'S theory of implied easement was acknowledged to 
be unsupported by any Idaho case law, to which any facts 
could be presented for them to prevail. This indicates the 
le, and without foundation natur 
I 
I COWARD'S implied easement claim. 
COWARD moved to amend and the Court permitted the 
filing of an Amended Complaint, which added, paragraph 4, 
I that a 1922 deed, Instrument No. 53126, either by express 
terms or by an implied right, was created by that 
I 
I instrument. 
There was no more "trial", and no more testimony was 
presented, only briefing was submitted to the Court. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ATTORNEY FEES TO 
THE DEFENDANT BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE ISSUE OF THIS 
MULTI-ISSUE ACTION. The Court's Amended Memorandum 
Decision, page 17, paragraph H, is the Court's analysis on 
HADLEYfS request for attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12-121 
and Rule 54(e)(1). The Court cited the provisions of Rule 
54 (e) (1) . The Court denied attorney fees to HADLEY by 
single analysis to what appears to be only the COWARD'S 
express easement theory by stating that what the parties to 
the 1922 deed intended by reserving an "alley" as a disputed 
question of fact, and it does not appear COWARD brought this 
action and pursued it frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation in fact or law, as alleged by HADLEY. 
This analysis of a single issue, express easement, 
makes no analysis of who prevailed "in the action" or of the 
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other issues of this action. The other issues were: 
a. prescriptive easement 
b. implied easement 
c. Agreement as to Boundary Line 
d . trespass 
e. quiet title 
HADLEY actually prevailed on all five (5) of these 
issues, and in the action, without COWARD ever presenting 
any fact or law to support prescriptive easement or implied 
easement. 
As to the Prescriptive Easement - COWARD suffered a 
"non-suit" dismissal of this cause of action. In other 
words, this cause of action, the Complaint, was dismissed, 
as stated in Rule 41(b) because of the ground that "...upon 
the facts and the law the Plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief." In other words, the prescriptive easement action 
through trial, upon the facts presented, had no basis in 
fact or law, which is "without foundation". 
ATTORNEY FEES ARE AWARDED TO THE PARTY THAT PREVAILS 
"IN THE ACTIONtf AS AN OVERALL VIEW, NOT A CLAIM-BY-CLAIM 
The Case of Eighteen Mile Ranch v .  Nord Excavating, 141 
Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005) states: 
" . . .In determining which party prevailed 
in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, 
the court determines who prevailed 'in 
the actionf. That is, the prevailing 
party question is examined and 
determined from an overall view, not a 
claim-by-claim analysis." 
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In Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 
716 at 719, the Supreme Court referred to the fact that 
most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved". 
In the instant action, HADLEY incurred no liability, 
COWARD prevailed on none of their three (3) theories of 
easements; prescriptive, implied, or express, HADLEY 
prevailed in trespass and quiet title. In other words, 
HADLEY received the most favorable outcome that could be 
achieved, demonstrating that COWARD'S entire action and 
defense was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation 
As stated in the Court's Amended Memorandum Decision, 
page 11, paragraph C., 
"The Cowards released any claimed right 
to lot 1 when they signed the Agreement 
on February 2007". 
Having agreed in writing to extinguish any claimed 
right to HADLEY'S real estate, within nine (9) months time 
they filed this action, Complaint, on November 29, 2007, 
seeking a claimed easement right and they recorded a Lis 
Pendens, January 14, 2009, Instrument No. 744377 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 32) in which they claimed that they had 
an "action encumbering" HADLEY' S real estate. 
The Court's analysis of COWARD'S express easement claim 
as involving "a disputed question of fact" does not shed any 
light on the fact that was supposedly disputed, nor was 
there a disputed fact on COWARD'S express easement claim, it 
failed as a matter of law. 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL - ARGUMENT 
HADLEY seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
41 based on Idaho - Code S12-123 and Idaho Code $12-121. 
aho Code S12-123 applies as C 
reasonable basis in fact or law, and Idaho Code S12-121 
applies as COWARD'S acts on appeal are frivolous, 
I 
unreasonably, or without foundation. These statutes apply 
because COWARD'S issues are nothing more than asking the 
appellant court to second guess the trial court. On 
COWARD'S first (1) issue presented on appeal, COWARD'S 
argument is that their action for a prescriptive easement, 
express easement, and implied easement does not affect 
HADLEY'S ownership or title; and, therefore that language of 
the Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit D, 
could not extinguish or release their claims against HADLEY 
and HADLEY'S real estate because an easement is only the 
right to use the land of another. COWARD'S response and 
argument to this issue shows that an easement is an interest 
in real property that affects and encumbers the title and 
ownership of the real property. COWARD does not recognize 
this on the appeal, but as pointed out by the District 
Court, in Findings of Fact 14, "Anne Coward subsequently 
recorded a Lis Pendens (Instrument No. 744377) as part of 
this action, in which she claimed an "encumbrance" on 
Crystal Hadley's Lot 1. " An "encumbrance" of a claimed 
easement by the lawsuit clearly affects HADLEY'S ownership 
and title to Lot 1, which was agreed to be extinguished or 
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released by the express language of the Agreement. COWARD'S 
Issue 1 is unreasonable, frivolous, without foundation, and 
is without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
As to COWARD'S second (2) issues presented on appeal 
wherein they claim the 1922 deed for Lots 1 and 2 from 
Daughters to Sletager wherein Daughters reserved an easement 
over Lots 1 and 2, also created an express easement in favor 
of Lot 2 to cross over Lot 1. This argument totally ignores 
that Lot 1 and 2 were both then owned by Sletager, who could 
cross over and use either property wherever desired without 
an easement. The Idaho law is that the owner of property 
can not have an easement in his own property, because the 
definition of an easement is the right to use property of 
another person. Issue 2 is unreasonable, frivolous, without 
foundation, and is without reasonable basis in fact or law. 
COWARD'S third (3) issue on appeal is that the 1922 
deed from Daughters to Sletager created an implied easement 
appurtenant to COWARDfS lot (Lot 2) which would allow COWARD 
access to their lot across HADLEY'S lot (Lot 1). First of 
all, COWARD'S Appellant's Brief does not set forth any law 
on "implied easements". The 1922 conveyance would not 
create an implied easement in favor of Lot 2 over Lot 1 
because Sletager then owned both Lots 1 and 2. None of the 
elements of an implied easement, either by prior use or by 
necessity, existed and COWARD has not briefed that legal 
theory. As is shown in HADLEYfS Response to Issue 3, there 
can be no implied easement. COWARD'S issue 3 is 
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unreasonable, frivolous, without foundation, and has no 
reasonable basis in law or fact. 
COWARD has not referred to any finding of fact or 
onclusion of law in the D 
- 
Decision that is in error, nor has COWARD asked for any 
relief on appeal. 
I 
1 CONCLUSION 
HADLEY seeks relief on appeal to recover attorney fees 
and costs against COWARD. 
HADLEY also seeks relief on her Cross-Appeal that the 
District Court erred in denying recovery of HADLEY'S 
attorney fees against COWARD. 
The appeal by COWARD should be denied and dismissed 
with attorney fees and costs to HADLEY. On HADLEY'S cross- 
appeal the matter should be remanded to the District Court 
to award attorney fees to HADLEY for the action, trial, and 
matters at the District Court level. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ajsrAday of March, 2010 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ZY7kday of March, 2010, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF, were mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were 
addressed to: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Office of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d1Alene, Idaho 83814 
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